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“Men work together,” I told him from the heart,
“Whether they work together or apart.”
–Robert Frost, “The Tuft of Flowers,” 
A Boy’s Will (1913)
People act in many ways. Occasionally we act
alone. More often, we act together, because, as
Aristotle said, humans are indeed social animals.1
Some group actions–and most individual ones–
have short-lived effects. Other mutual actions are
organized, enduring, and extraordinarily effective.
These cases usually involve organizations, called
institutions, that coordinate and maximize the effec-
tiveness of individual actions. Over time, however,
institutions often take on their own lives, beyond
those of the people acting within them. Eventually,
the institutions may be so rooted in past crises that
they no longer ½t emerging needs. We can see this
phenomenon now, in the institutions that our
grandparents developed to deal with our nation’s–
indeed, our entire continent’s–energy needs.
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Abstract: This essay notes some of the key institutions created in the twentieth century for the purpose of
delivering energy in North America. Those institutions are being challenged by a combination of stresses in
three interconnected areas: reliability, economics, and environmental sustainability. The essay argues
that these three stresses create an “energy trilemma” requiring institutional reform. We suggest that new
and modi½ed institutions can best be understood if we evaluate them along three dimensions: institutional
scale, structure, and scope. We consider real-world examples of recent institutions in light of each of these
dimensions and note both successes and concerns that those factors illuminate. We conclude by noting
that some institutional changes will be organic and unplanned; but many others, including responses to
climate change, will bene½t from conscious attention to scale, structure, and scope by those engaged in
designing and building the energy institutions needed in the twenty-½rst century.
In the United States, those institutions
were characterized by:
• an energy system with two broad wings,
one based on lightly regulated delivery
of energy for transportation through
liquid fuels, and the other based on
closely regulated delivery of even larg-
er amounts of energy in the form of
electricity;
• an energy supply for transportation that
came to rely on petroleum purchased
through international markets–with
easy transport on a global scale and an
assumption of stable patterns of users
and suppliers–supported by major
governmental subsidies and prefer-
ences, but with price regulation only in
the rarest of circumstances;
• an energy supply for light, heat, cooling,
and power that is dependent on electric
grids combining large, centralized elec-
tric power plants with bottleneck
transmission systems;
• control systems that coordinated gen-
eration and transmission through a
pyramidal architecture for the opera-
tional control, dispatch, and delivery of
power with a primary emphasis on reli-
ability;
• the ½nancing of central-station power
plants through long-term bonds, as val-
ued by Wall Street ratings analysts;
• a primary reliance on investor-owned
utilities that attracted private investors
who expected decades of technological
stability to yield long-term, low-risk
revenues; and
• a regulatory structure that limited both
excessive returns and easy entry of new
retail competitors, and that recognized
both local and national concerns
through state and federal regulatory
agencies.
Those functions, and the institutions
providing them, worked well (at least for
America) in the postwar world of the
1950s and 1960s. They met the funda-
mental test of “½tness” by matching the
scale, scope, and structure of institutions
to those of the problems they addressed.2
However, in the decades since then,
energy institutions have come under
increasingly dif½cult strains in at least
three strategic areas. The ½rst of these is
reliability, as measured against both acci-
dental and deliberate security challenges.
The second is ½nancial, with a long-term
trend of increasing burdens on gross
national product and individual house-
holds. And the third is environmental, with
rising concerns about toxic substances
(such as mercury) and the role of energy
production as the prime source of the
greenhouse gases that are driving global
climate change. 
Major institutional change will be
required to meet the closely interrelated
challenges of this “energy trilemma.”3
Some of those changes will arise unex-
pectedly, without planning and through
organic processes that may be painful for
us all; others may come more readily if
we can think in organized ways about the
institutional transformations we expect
and desire. In that effort, it is useful to
organize our thoughts in terms of the scale,
structure, and scope of the ways in which
institutions behave. 
This will be a decades-long process of
“continual improvement” extending far
beyond what can be discussed within the
bounds of this essay; but to help begin
the process, we offer here some examples
of both theoretical concepts and practi-
cal steps that may be useful. Our sugges-
tions are aimed at the low-hanging fruit:
that is, the relationships that already
exist and the approaches that have
already been adopted in different sectors.
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focus on them as illustrating emergent
trends in each area, not as assertions
about the many changes that will actually
be needed. One example is spatial, deal-
ing with scale; a second is structural,
blending public and private enterprises;
and the third is jurisdictional, arguing
that energy institutions must have the
scope to address climate change.
Currently, our energy systems are usual-
ly conceived of as multiple entities, each
nested within a tidy jurisdictional hierar-
chy. This is in many ways similar to the
“pyramidal structure” of the telecommu-
nications system managed by at&t from
the 1920s until its breakup in the 1970s.
The breakup of that system-network
architecture was the result of antitrust
litigation and consent decrees, but its
underlying cause was technological inno-
vation.4 When that physical architecture
became outmoded, so did the monopolis-
tic control structure. As Peter Huber stated
in a 1987 report on the telephone industry: 
The old pyramid, with all its mass in the
center, is being transformed into a geodesic
dome, with a profusion of nodes and links
unknown in the older architecture, connect-
ed around the outside. at&t undoubtedly
recognized this clearly when it agreed to
surrender the heart of its old network for
permission to participate fully in building
the new one.5
The energy sector would bene½t from a
similarly networked structure, as the
slowly emerging architecture of a “dis-
tributed network” suggests. As that hap-
pens, traditional institutions of control
will need radical change or replacements.
Before we delve into the details of how
U.S. energy institutions ought to be re-
formed, we should clarify what we mean
by the terms governance and polycentrism.
Governance, broadly considered, refers
to how humans make decisions and form
institutions that craft rules shaping
behavior. At its most elemental level,
governance is about deciding who can do
what, who will monitor it, and how rules
are modi½ed and changed over time.6 The
term refers to “any of the myriad process-
es through which a group of people set
and enforce the rules needed to enable
that group to achieve desired outcomes.”7
Both public and private bodies have cre-
ated institutions to carry out governance
functions. Traditionally these have been
nested vertically, with neighborhoods
operating below cities, which operate
below states/provinces, which operate
below national institutions.8 Within its
scope, and at its scale, each provides a
variety of services (such as education,
national defense, and administration of a
currency).9
Although much research and dialogue
continues to emphasize what these gov-
ernment actors do, in recent decades
scholars have begun to address gover-
nance that occurs outside of traditional
structures at scales ranging from families
and ½rms to nations and intergovernmen-
tal organizations. Polycentrism is a term
with many meanings. In the context of
institutions of governance relating to
energy, it describes the concepts identi½ed
by the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom.
She uses polycentric to refer to the self-
organization of citizens into multiple au-
thorities at many scales simultaneously.10
The notion of polycentric governance
evolved out of discussions of governance
related to public goods, common-pool
resources, and collective action problems. 
Polycentrism emphasizes that sharing
of power among numerous scales of gov-
ernance must be seamlessly managed,
resulting in a “polycentricity” or “nested-
ness” that involves multiple authorities
and overlapping jurisdictions. It can also
stipulate that different energy institutions
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the particular energy problem at hand.
This criterion is similar to the “matching
principle” in environmental law, which
states that governance structures need to
be “matched” to the speci½c type of threat:
for instance, pollution of a river would
require a governance regime encompass-
ing all states and communities along that
river basin; local groundwater threats
would by contract need only a governance
regime at the city or municipal level.11
When applied to the debate over U.S.
energy policy, relying on a polycentric lens
has helpful implications regarding the
appropriate scale of institutions and their
responsibilities. For a problem like col-
lecting data on energy-related pollution
from mercury, particulate matter, nitro-
gen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon
dioxide, a national system is far prefer-
able to a local one. It makes little sense to
have every state, city, or town measure
carbon dioxide emissions, track the car-
bon intensity of fuels, determine their
health effects, identify a safe level of
emissions, and design cost-effective policy
responses. Such a system is inef½cient,
and having many pairs of eyes spread
across the country is more likely to result
in anomalies than if regulation is concen-
trated in just one location.12
However, issues at the scale of electric
utilities (which span individual states)
and transmission operators should be
treated as regional concerns. The best
examples here are existing regional trans-
mission operators (rtos) and indepen-
dent system operators (isos). The Energy
Policy Act of 1992 greatly enhanced U.S.
electricity restructuring, a term that gener-
ally refers to the introduction of retail
competition and the unbundling of elec-
tricity assets into distinct generation,
transmission, and distribution entities.
Worried about reliability issues, groups
of electric utilities pooled together to
form rtos and isos to ensure equal
access to the power grid and operate
wholesale electricity networks.13 Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (ferc)
orders 888 and 889 also encouraged the
creation of operators such as the Midwest
Independent Transmission System Oper-
ator and pjm Interconnection. These
operators coordinate electricity supply
and high-voltage transmission across
wide geographic regions to maximize
delivery; ensure suf½cient reserves and
backup power; and enable ½rms to buy,
sell, and trade electricity on spot markets.
In an important sense, they provide the
vital governance functions for electricity
issues that we call “too large for states
and too small for a nation.”
Energy issues that correspond to world-
wide problems are best treated at the
scale of global ½rms and institutions.
Subsidies for fossil fuels are one example,
particularly in the transportation sector.
Total subsidies are dif½cult to pin down,
but one independent review estimated
that in 1999, energy subsidies existed in
more than one hundred countries and
amounted to a whopping 21.1 percent of
all energy prices, in essence subsidizing
more than one-½fth of global energy con-
sumption. The reviewers calculated that
subsidies for fossil fuels and energy ex-
ceeded $331 billion in 2000 and that sub-
sidies for road transportation amounted
to $1,180 billion–a total of $1.5 trillion in
2000, or $1.9 trillion in today’s dollars.14
At the level of individual states or coun-
tries, subsidy reform would be ineffective
because the market effects of subsidies
from other countries would continue to
hide true global energy costs. Climate
change presents a similar problem. Indi-
vidual countries have little incentive to
cut emissions without reductions from
other countries because those acting ½rst
may suffer higher energy costs and may
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Another complex energy issue requires
forms of polycentric governance that
address international maritime regions.
For example, Barents 2020 is a joint 
Norwegian-Russian health, safety, and
environmental standards-setting project
involving government agencies, oil and
gas ½rms, scienti½c and research institu-
tions, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (ngos) across the geographic scope
of the Barents Sea. These actors collabo-
rate to harmonize “common acceptable
standards for safeguarding people, envi-
ronment and asset values in the oil and
gas industry.”15 The founders of the proj-
ect concluded that the optimal way to
mitigate the risks and overcome the chal-
lenges that are unique to the Barents Sea
marine area was to develop standards 
tailored speci½cally to the region. They
formed an international body that
matched in scale the regional problem
shared by two nations, and they created
rules of conduct for every player–public
or private–that operates in the region,
regardless of nationality. 
At the other end of the scale, polycen-
tric analysis can identify places where
local and decentralized action is best. 
For example, the Renewable Energy and
Energy Ef½ciency Partnership (reeep)
funnels investment into clean-energy
projects in the developing world–but
only at the local level. Established in 2002
by a collection of regulators, businesses,
banks, and ngos, reeep works to reduce
emissions, improve access to reliable and
clean energy in developing countries, and
promote energy ef½ciency. reeep funds
energy-ef½ciency and renewable-energy
projects that have the potential to be
widely replicated in many different 
regulatory frameworks and in a variety 
of countries and energy markets. The
organization receives its funding from
governments and a collection of banks,
other ngos, and businesses, primarily
through donations and voluntary contri-
butions. 
In the 2008 program year, reeep part-
nered with 44 governments, 180 private
organizations (such as banks, businesses,
and other ngos), and six multilateral
organizations (such as the United Na-
tions). The organization managed a €6.1
million ($7.8 million) annual operating
budget distributed among 145 projects
representing a total cumulative invest-
ment of €65 million ($83.4 million), most
of which was leveraged from reeep part-
ners through equity ½nancing. Thirty-
seven additional projects were in the
works by late 2008 and early 2009. These
new projects included the promotion of
solar water heaters in Uganda, energy-
ef½cient lighting in India, rural biomass
development in China, renewable-energy
½nancing in Mexico, and assessment of
the regulatory framework for renewable
energy in Argentina.16
In short, polycentrism suggests that
some energy problems are best addressed
by neighborhood, city, and state institu-
tions; others by state, regional, and fed-
eral institutions. But again, at each scale a
multitude of actors must be involved to
ensure institutional diversity. 
A look at the structure of institutional
relationships can help us search for
improvements. In recent years, confronta-
tional tones have dominated media cov-
erage of interactions between U.S. energy
institutions and the industry. However,
that portrayal does not reflect reality. The
government has cooperated with the
energy industry in a number of ways. In
this section, we argue that U.S. energy
institutions should do more to recognize,
strengthen, and expand the public-private
partnership elements of their structures. 
Judging by the headlines, the U.S. gov-
ernment seems to be engaged in perva-
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and the fossil fuel industries. Consider the
following statement by the President and
ceo of the American Petroleum Institute,
Jack Gerard: 
[The administration] has been restricting
oil and natural gas development, leasing less
often, shortening lease terms, and going
slow on permit approvals–actions which
have undermined public support for the
administration on energy. It is also increas-
ing or threatening to increase industry’s
development costs through higher taxes,
higher royalty rates, and higher minimum
lease bids.17
Similarly, American Electric Power
(aep), an Ohio-based megautility, dedi-
cated a portion of the “Corporate Citizen-
ship” section of its website to criticism of
the Obama administration, particularly
the Environmental Protection Agency
(epa).18 A subsection entitled “What
Others Are Saying” contained twenty-two
news articles criticizing rules that have
been and are being promulgated by the
epa under the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act.19 Interestingly, these “others”
unanimously agree that the results of the
epa’s recent rule-making will signi½cant-
ly hurt the U.S. economy and lead to the
loss of as many as 1.4 million jobs. With
sharply worded titles like “Go green, kill
jobs” and “The epa’s War on Jobs,” many
of the articles use a militarized tone in
expressing support for aep’s position.
Unsurprisingly, the government some-
times responds in a similar manner. For
example, when the oil and gas industries
criticized changes in how permits are
issued following the bp Deepwater Hori-
zon oil spill, former Director of the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regula-
tion and Enforcement (boemre) Michael
Bromwich called the industry’s accusa-
tions “politically motivated” and “erro-
neous.”20 epa Administrator Lisa P. Jack-
son, who became the primary target of
the large utilities that rely on coal-½red
power generation, reacted to mounting
criticism of upcoming rules under the
Clean Air Act with a strike of her own. “I
do very much believe that it’s time for us
to get past this tired dance, where folks
inside this Beltway get paid a lot of
money to say things that aren’t true
about public health initiatives that this
agency is charged by law with undertak-
ing,” said Jackson in response to pressure
from industry lobbying groups.21
The point of these examples is not to
assess the merits of arguments presented
by either side, but rather to highlight the
common assertions that government and
industry are in conflict with each other.22
However, underlying the appearance of
discord is a deeper truth: namely, that
public and private energy institutions
have a long history of working together.
One entire energy sector, the nuclear
industry, was conceived, born, and taught
to walk in government labs, mines, and
naval vessels. The transportation fuels
sector relies on the U.S. military presence
around the world to ensure reliable trans-
port of oil and gas. Both sectors, like other
energy industries, rely heavily on support-
ive tax policies and governmental grants.
Moreover, regulated companies com-
monly play a major part in shaping the
regulations under which they operate.23
Public-private cooperation on energy
issues exists for several reasons. Perhaps
the most compelling is that many energy-
related technologies have grown so com-
plex that regulators simply cannot keep
up with technological advances. Offshore
oil and gas exploration and extraction are
good examples of such technological
advancement. Members of the National
Commission on the bp Deepwater Hori-
zon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling stated
in their 2011 report to the president that
drilling the Macondo well was “a com-
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authors also noted: “The remarkable
advances that have propelled the move to
deepwater drilling merit comparison with
exploring outer space.” Unsurprisingly,
the commission recommended arming
“those in charge of regulatory oversight”
with necessary technical expertise.24
Failure to raise a red flag is not the only
problem created by a lack of technical
know-how. An overly cautious regulator
may shut down a promising new technol-
ogy because she simply does not under-
stand it. For both reasons, the need for
technological expertise often presses par-
ties to blur the line between public and
private governance of energy projects. 
Government and industry cooperate in
other ways. Research and development
support, government procurement, and
energy pilot programs all offer signi½cant
bene½ts to private enterprises. According
to the Congressional Budget Of½ce, fed-
eral support for developing and produc-
ing energy technologies totaled approxi-
mately $24 billion in 2011.25 Federal,
state, and municipal governments have
large vehicle fleets and real estate inven-
tories, both requiring vast amounts of
energy. Governments also have unique
needs that at times can be met only with
the technologies that have not penetrated
the commercial market. For example,
many municipalities have switched to
natural gas–powered buses. Thus, gov-
ernment procurement and trial programs
can accomplish perhaps the hardest task:
bringing a shiny prototype through to a
commercially scalable product.
Although sharply worded headlines
and remarks give the impression that
both sides would have to build a relation-
ship from scratch, a legal and regulatory
framework for such cooperation already
exists. The Administrative Procedure Act
(apa) of 1946 sets forth the process for
federal agency rule-making, allowing the
public–including energy providers–to
use notice-and-comment procedures to
influence the regulations to which they
might be subject.26
The National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act (nttaa) of 1995 lays
out, among other things, a system of
research and development cooperation
between the energy industry and the gov-
ernment.27 It also directs federal agencies
to use technical standards developed by
voluntary consensus standards bodies,
except where “inconsistent with appli-
cable law or otherwise impractical.”28
Thus, the nttaa gives congressional
endorsement to the practice of “recruit-
ing” outside authority in developing
standards and regulations.29 The Of½ce of
Management and Budget (omb) Circular
No. A-119, “Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Con-
sensus Standards and in Conformity
Assessment Activities,” which clari½es
section 12 of the nttaa, represents yet
another endorsement of this cooperative
regulatory approach.30 In a 2010 report on
voluntary consensus standards and con-
formity assessment, Mary F. Donaldson
of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology emphasized the follow-
ing bene½ts of private-public partnership
in setting standards:
Federal investment in voluntary standards
development helps to provide sound tech-
nological underpinning to standards, speeds
the standards development process, and
enables the adoption of vcss [voluntary
consensus standards] to support agency
missions. Furthermore, adoption of vcss
for Federal agency use provides cost savings
to Federal agencies, the Nation’s businesses,
and the taxpayer through reduced injuries
and deaths, increased transactional ef½-
ciencies, reduced administrative burdens,
and lower costs of products and services.31
More recently, the Federal Energy Reg-
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industry expertise to address concerns
raised by the widespread electricity
blackout that occurred in 2003. After the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 granted ferc
explicit authority to require mandatory
standards for reliability in the electric
sector, the commission authorized a new
institution, the National Electric Reli-
ability Corporation (nerc), to coordinate
industry expertise and develop speci½c
reliability standards and sanctions. 
In spite of these examples, some may
view the possibility of closer cooperation
between U.S. energy institutions and the
energy industry with skepticism. It is true
that when regulators and the regulated are
close in every facet of their relationship,
the lines between the two begin to blur.
Therefore, it is critical for energy institu-
tions to determine whether industry
cooperation is appropriate with respect
to speci½c instances, areas, and functions.
A case in point is the failure of the Miner-
als Management Service (mms) to pre-
vent the bp Deepwater Horizon accident. 
The mms was what the members of
the National Commission on the bp
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling called in their Report to the Pres-
ident a “cross-purposes regulator.” This
means it was responsible for three distinct
and conflicting functions: resource man-
agement; revenue collection; and health,
safety, and environmental oversight. The
authors of the report eloquently captured
the biggest structural flaw of the mms:
“From birth, mms had a built-in incentive
to promote offshore drilling in sharp ten-
sion with its mandate to ensure safe
drilling and environmental protection.”
As a result, the agency developed a very
close “cooperative” relationship with the
industry, the kind that led to one of the
worst environmental and economic dis-
asters in the nation’s history. Cooperation
relative to safety, however, was virtually
nonexistent. “It was like pulling teeth,”
stated a senior mms employee: “We
never got positive cooperation from
either industry or the Of½ce of Manage-
ment and Budget.”32
The existing legal framework allows
government agencies, including energy
institutions, to be creative in placing
safeguards to prevent the cross-purposes
regulator problem. For example, agencies
do not always have to follow “the some-
what rudimentary rulemaking provisions
of the apa.”33 Separation of functions
among and within U.S. energy institu-
tions and their structural units allows
private-public cooperation where it is
appropriate and bene½cial for both sides.
This approach can also block the indus-
try from in½ltrating governmental over-
sight, permitting, and licensing functions
and allows agencies, departments, and
civil servants to ful½ll their missions. 
In this section, we have discussed
research and development cooperation,
commercialization of new technologies,
participation in rule-making, and use of
industry standards as possible avenues of
cooperation between energy institutions
and the industry. We also see a place in
this kind of cooperation for creative ideas
–such as William Pedersen’s “regulatory
reform contracts”–provided that govern-
mental institutions can always be distin-
guished from regulated entities.34 In fact,
the energy sector is not the only ½eld in
which players can be both governmental
and regulated entities at the same time.
Consider, for example, the Port Authority
of the States of New York and New Jersey
or the role of any telecommunications
utility exercising eminent domain over the
land of others. In the 1982 case Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manahttan CATV Corporation,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that
apartment owners had to be compensated
if the state of New York required them to
allow cable companies to run wires to
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on remand, the Court of Appeals held
that the economic value of that compen-
sation could be set at a level too low to be
worth collecting, typically a token $1 per
building.35
The Barents 2020 project (discussed
above) is also instructive. After providing
the initial funding, the Norwegian gov-
ernment connected its standardization
agencies with the project. It then helped
facilitate a coalition consisting of the
domestic and international oil and gas
industries, research institutions, and
ngos. Finally, the Norwegian govern-
ment and other Barents 2020 partners
persuaded the Russian government,
research institutions, and the oil and gas
industry to join as well.36 As a result,
Norwegian and Russian governments
were kept in the loop during the technical-
ly challenging standards-setting process.
The industry bene½ted from the scienti½c
expertise of participating research insti-
tutions, as well as from the trust it gained
from government authorities and ngos,
none of which were separated from the
process by closed boardroom doors.
The successes of some public-private
cooperation and the potential for new
creative ideas are dif½cult to disregard.37
U.S. energy institutions and the energy
industry should continue on the same
path, giving increased consideration to the
need for transparency and public under-
standing of each party’s complex role.
A third factor, the jurisdictional scope of
an institution, is also helpful to consider.
A prime example is the historic view of
climate change as merely an environmen-
tal issue. This outlook has contributed to
the failure of decision-makers to recog-
nize and mitigate the phenomenon’s eco-
nomic risks. Such risks are foreseeable
and, to some degree, manageable, espe-
cially if considered in the context of an
institution’s goals and responsibilities.
Therefore, it is mandatory that U.S. en-
ergy institutions incorporate climate
change risks into the scope of their deci-
sion-making, fundamentally altering
how they weigh economic costs and
bene½ts. 
Climate change has been a topic of
global public discussion for more than
thirty years. However, in the United
States, it has gained serious governmental
consideration only in the last decade.38
Exxon Mobil, a longtime climate change
skeptic, softened its public position in
2007.39 The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (rggi), the ½rst market-based
program designed to decrease green-
house gas emissions in the United States,
held its ½rst auction on September 25,
2008.40 There was much public excite-
ment surrounding the Fifteenth Confer-
ence of the Parties (cop 15) that took
place in Copenhagen in December 2009.
There, the U.S. delegation, led by Presi-
dent Obama, played an active role in
negotiating the Copenhagen Accord, a
political agreement that served as a ½rst
step to the post-Kyoto regime.41 With the
Waxman-Markey climate bill pending in
Congress, it seemed that the United States
was on the verge of signi½cant domestic
policy changes.42
Yet those changes never materialized.
The climate legislation died in the Senate,
and the 2010 midterm elections ended all
near-term prospects for its revival in the
House of Representatives.43 cop 16 in
Cancun, Mexico, and cop 17 in Durban,
South Africa, garnered only a fraction of
the media coverage that the Copenhagen
meeting received. The level of public
awareness and concern about climate
change dropped as well. Americans now
seem less certain than they were a decade
ago about the accuracy of global warm-
ing news coverage, about humankind’s
role in causing global warming, and about
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On the other hand, rggi appears to be
weathering the climate change policy
“chill” of the early 2010s. It held its six-
teenth auction on June 6, 2012.45 In terms
of our three factors of scale, structure,
and scope, rggi may be a good example
of a new institution that is larger than a
state but smaller than a nation, is struc-
tured by government to channel private
investment, and has a scope that includes
both environmental and economic con-
siderations. 
The fact that climate change is no
longer a front-page issue does not mean
that the problem itself has ceased to exist.
Moreover, the failure to address climate
change ampli½es potentially grave risks
for the struggling U.S. economy. Unfor-
tunately, most Americans do not view cli-
mate change as an economic issue. In
fact, Gallup poll analysis of the “Most
Important Problem” facing the nation
does not list climate change as an eco-
nomic issue.46 The historic perception of
climate change as a predominately envi-
ronmental issue has slowed the response
to the problem.47 The framing of climate
change as an environmental, rather than
an energy, priority is also tied to the fact
that it was meteorologists, climatologists,
and environmental scientists who ½rst
sounded the alarm.48 In addition, calls
for climate change mitigation, or even
mere acknowledgment of the problem,
are often labeled “radical environmental-
ism” by conservative politicians.49
Early attempts to reclassify climate
change as something more than an envi-
ronmental issue were made in the early
2000s. In the 2003 Pentagon report “An
Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its
Implications for United States National
Security,” authors Peter Schwartz and
Doug Randall described the national
security threats posed by rapid climate
change.50 British economist Nicholas
Stern released the most comprehensive
analysis of the economic impacts of cli-
mate change, the Stern Review on the Eco-
nomics of Climate Change, in October
2006.51 The Stern Review noted that the
economic cost of inaction can range from
5 percent to 20 percent of global gdp per
year.52 By contrast, the cost of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and avoiding
related economic damage is estimated to
be around 1 percent of global gdp.53
According to the report, the risks of cata-
strophic damage can be signi½cantly
decreased if atmospheric greenhouse gas
levels are stabilized between 450 and 550
ppm of CO2 equivalent.54
Unfortunately, the Stern Review’s rec-
ommendations have not been taken seri-
ously in most sectors of the U.S. economy,
including the energy sector. Because the
energy sector is the economy’s driving
force, failure to take into account the eco-
nomic implications of climate change may
lead to dire consequences, not only for the
sector itself, but for the entire economy. 
Expanding the scope of institutional
concerns turns a debate over sea-level rise
into a conversation about the economic
risk of allowing the construction of large
power plants near the coastline. This
shift in perspective converts the high
costs and uncertain bene½ts of mitigating
climate change into the manageable costs
of mitigating climate change risks and
the palpable bene½ts of avoiding foresee-
able economic, social, and environmental
damage. Therefore, by bringing the eco-
nomic risks of climate change into the
scope of factors that an energy institution
should consider, the scale of the problem
can be adjusted to ½t the scale of the insti-
tution. This shift in perspective also has
the potential to humanize the impacts of
climate change, making them more visible
and visceral. The previously abstract
notion of “populations occupying low-
lying coastlines” becomes indigenous
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sion of saltwater in their wells; similarly,
“percentage of gdp lost” becomes
minority shop owners in New Jersey and
New York repairing hurricane-damaged
boardwalks, and “displaced populations”
becomes tribal refugees in the Maldives
relocating their homes to higher ground. 
It may be an interesting and intellectual-
ly challenging exercise for economists to
dissect the aggressive assumptions made
by the authors of the Stern Review.55
After all, environmental economists Wil-
liam Nordhaus and Robert O. Mendelsohn
somewhat infamously critiqued certain as-
pects of its methods concerning discount-
ing,56 demographics, extreme weather,
and equity.57 However, it is simply impru-
dent for U.S. energy institutions to ignore
the economic risks noted in the report in
relation to the energy subsector, even if
those risks cannot be precisely known or
forecasted by economic models.
Treating climate change from the
standpoint of risk assessment has been
embraced by the U.S. Navy and the insur-
ance industry, entities that cannot be
described as “radically environmental,”
even by conservative pundits. In May
2010, the Department of the Navy
released the “U.S. Navy Climate Change
Roadmap.”58 In the opening paragraph of
their report, the members of Task Force
Climate Change unambiguously stated
the rationale for preparing the roadmap: 
Climate change is a national security chal-
lenge with strategic implications for the
Navy. Climate change will lead to increased
tensions in nations with weak economies
and political institutions. While climate
change alone is not likely to lead to future
conflict, it may be a contributing factor.
Climate change is affecting, and will con-
tinue to affect, U.S. military installations
and access to natural resources worldwide.
It will affect the type, scope, and location of
future Navy missions.59
The roadmap identi½es the following
focus areas for incorporating climate
change considerations: 1) strategy, policy,
and plans; 2) operations and training; 3)
investments in capability and infrastruc-
ture; 4) strategic communications and
outreach; and 5) environmental assess-
ment and prediction. The ½nal focus area
is especially noteworthy, as it lays out the
basis for incorporating climate change
considerations into the scope of the U.S.
Navy’s decision-making process. The
goal of the roadmap is “[t]o provide Navy
leadership and decision makers a science-
based, comprehensive understanding of
the timing, severity, and impact of current
and predicted global environmental
change on tactical, operational, and
strategic (climatic) scales.”60
For their part, insurance companies
assess risk for a living. They, too, believe
that the scope of climate change is larger
than an environmental concern. Among
the ½rst private enterprises to place seri-
ous emphasis on the economic risks posed
by climate change, many insurance com-
panies no longer rely on individual efforts
to grapple with climate change risks; they
have joined the industry-wide movement
ClimateWise.61 Established in 2007 by
the Prince of Wales, ClimateWise now
has more than forty members, including
insurance giants such as Allianz, Aviva,
Lloyd’s, Swiss Re, and Zurich.62 Chairman
John Coomber, a member of the Swiss
Re’s board, captured the essence of the
ClimateWise mission in the following
statement: 
Insurers everywhere should be using our
industry’s core expertise to better under-
stand and communicate the risks climate
change poses to our economic and social
systems and to forge and promote solu-
tions to bring those risks down to an
acceptable level. This independent review
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world are indeed actively playing this role
in a variety of ways.63
By joining ClimateWise, members com-
mit to the following principles. They must
1) lead in risk analysis, 2) inform public
policy-making, 3) support climate aware-
ness among customers, 4) incorporate
climate change into investment strategies,
5) reduce the environmental impact of
their own businesses, and 6) report and be
accountable.64 The participating insurers
may act individually or collectively to
“reduce the economy’s and society’s long-
term risk from climate change, within
the con½nes of a competitive market.”65
Despite the obvious differences in each
entity’s reasons for incorporating climate
change risks into their decision-making
processes, U.S. energy institutions have
much in common with the U.S. Navy and
the insurance industry. Large coal-½red
and nuclear power plants, oil pipelines,
and unexplored offshore oil and gas ½elds
are capital-intensive investments. They
are economically attractive only if con-
struction costs can be spread over time
and reduced to competitive levels through
the use of long-term ½nancings such as
thirty-year bonds; to appreciate this
issue, imagine the rate effect of recover-
ing the full cost of a $5 billion power plant
in ten years of 10 percent annual deprecia-
tion, rather than with thirty-plus years of 
3 percent annual depreciation. However,
spreading cost recovery over a thirty-year
period is rational only if one is sure that
neither fundamental climate, nor basic
fuels, nor regulatory requirements, nor
access to huge quantities of water will
become problematic during those de-
cades. Utilities may be willing to gamble
on those expectations, but their investors
are unlikely to do so. 
Therefore, just as the U.S. Navy believes
that climate change implications will
compromise its ability to protect national
security, U.S. energy institutions should
view climate change as a threat to their
mission of ensuring a reliable energy sup-
ply. Similarly, as the insurance industry
works to protect investments that can be
susceptible to the economic risks posed
by climate change, U.S. energy institu-
tions should work to protect their cus-
tomers–and American society at large–
from investing in energy projects and
technologies that will become obsolete in
the face of a changing climate.
It is encouraging to see more calls for
incorporating climate change risk into
the scope of energy decision-making. In
the last two years, Ceres, a promoter of
sustainable business practices, has issued
a series of reports targeting climate
change risks in connection with the ener-
gy sector.66 One recent report, “Practic-
ing Risk-Aware Electricity Regulation:
What Every State Regulator Needs to
Know,” is particularly noteworthy. It pro-
vides an overview of risks associated
with investment in energy infrastructure,
discusses the regulatory challenges of
managing such risks, and outlines seven
critical strategies for making risk-aware
regulatory decisions. The report captures
the message of this essay: U.S. energy
institutions need to include climate
change risks in the scope of their deci-
sion-making process; and moreover, this
must be done now in order to avoid eco-
nomic losses in the near future.67
We began by noting some of the key
institutions created in the twentieth cen-
tury for the purpose of delivering energy
throughout North America. We observed
that these institutions are being challenged
by a combination of stresses in three
areas: reliability, economics, and envi-
ronmental sustainability. As we have sug-
gested, the institutional reforms needed to
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understood in terms of the scale, struc-
ture, and scope of new and modi½ed
institutions. In considering real-world
examples of recently formed institutions,
we have noted both successes and con-
cerns that these three factors illustrate. 
In particular, issues of scale will
increasingly call for polycentric organi-
zations that interlace multiple interests
rather than operate in simple hierarchies.
Thus, polycentrism offers a way forward,
a way to connect the different levels, and
a way to use the level of the household
and the local community to ½nd solu-
tions to regional and international chal-
lenges. Issues of structure will require
cooperation between public and private
sectors, signaling an increasing need to
clarify the distinctions between those
sectors. Issues of scope help explain both
the failure of the energy sector’s respons-
es to climate change and the need to face
that challenge. 
The social science research cited above
can help explain and improve the deliv-
ery of energy services; indeed, there is
real value in further research on these
topics. For a century or more, societies
like ours have treated social and technical
issues as fundamentally different. The
costs of doing so have been profound, as
C. P. Snow illustrates in The Two Cultures
and a Second Look (1959).68 Conversely,
the bene½ts of bridging the gap between
Lord Snow’s two cultures may be vital. In
pragmatic terms, key energy institutions
are hiring behavioral analysts to predict
and identify the factors that drive such
things as energy demand, public respons-
es to siting proposals, and climate change
denial.69 Similarly, the conceptual work
of Carnegie Mellon University’s program
on Engineering and Public Policy is start-
ing to produce helpful insights into behav-
ioral responses to new energy policies.
Some institutional changes will be
organic and unplanned, but many others
will bene½t from conscious attention 
to scale, structure, and scope by those
engaged in designing and building the
energy institutions that the twenty-½rst
century needs. Those who are “present at
the creation”70 of energy institutions for a
new energy world will do well to use those
concepts consciously as they face the age-
old tasks of “½tting” institutions to tech-
nological realities and of looking to the
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